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This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the con-
tribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model
explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing
so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in production-function estimates and gener-
ate testable hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy. Our empirical
¯ndings on a panel of France's regions over 1985-92 suggest that electoral concerns and
in°uence activities were, indeed, signi¯cant determinants of the cross-regional alloca-
tion of transportation infrastructure investments. By contrast, we ¯nd little evidence
of concern for the maximization of economic returns to infrastructure spending, even
after controlling for pork-barrel.
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The contribution of public infrastructure capital to growth is still today a largely unset-
tled question in spite of a massive amount of research sparked by the in°uential work
of Aschauer (1989a, b). Early studies of the link between public capital and growth were
fraught with logical and econometric di±culties, the most important of which are discussed
by Gramlich (1994) and, more recently, by Haughwout (2002). In addition to the impor-
tant aggregation issues discussed by Haughwout, some authors argued that the direction of
causation was unclear (see Eisner, 1991; Tatom, 1993; or Holtz-Eakin, 1994). For instance,
Holtz-Eakin remarked that \it is tempting to infer a causal relationship from public-sector
capital to productivity, but the evidence does not justify this step.It is just as easy to
imagine the reverse scenario in which deteriorating economic conditions reduce capital-
stock growth" (1994, p.12). Disagreement over the meaning of elasticity estimates was
not limited to time-series studies. Holtz-Eakin (1988), Munnell (1990a,b) and Garcia-Milµ a
(1992) also found positive elasticities of output to public capital using panel data at the
state level (although their estimates were smaller than Aschauer's) but state-level evidence
was vulnerable to similar criticism: quoting again Holtz-Eakin (1994, p.13), \[b]ecause
more prosperous states are likely to spend more on public capital, there will be a positive
correlation between the state-speci¯c e®ects and public sector capital. This should not be
confused, however, with the notion that greater public capital leads a state to be more
productive". Holtz-Eakin's own approach consisted of introducing ¯xed e®ects in the spec-
i¯cation of the error structure in order to control for unobserved state characteristics. But,
as he himself remarked (p.13), \in doing so the investigator ignores the information from
cross-state variation in the variables", which is of course unfortunate given that in a panel
of short duration a substantial part of the information comes, precisely, from the data's
cross-sectional variation.
This paper addresses the endogeneity issue directly,1 by using simultaneous-equation
estimation (see Hulten, 1995 for a discussion; see also Tatom, 1993). A few authors followed
this approach, e.g. Du®y-Deno and Eberts (1991) or Flores de Frutos and Pereira (1993),
and nevertheless found signi¯cant elasticities of output to infrastructure capital. But the
key question, if one believes that the endogeneity issue matters, is how infrastructure in-
1By \endogeneity issue" we mean endogeneity of public infrastructure investments. By contrast, unlike
Haughwout (2002) we do not consider endogenous location of ¯rms or households. The issue is discussed
further in section 3.2 below.
1vestment decisions should be modelled. Clearly, the \second equation" should be grounded
in a theory of how public infrastructure investment decisions are made. Indeed, Gramlich
(1994) rightly points out that the primary interest of the infrastructure debate is not so
much in the battle over elasticity estimates as in the implied policy debate. In his words,
\rather than asking whether there is a shortage, it seems more helpful to ask what, if any,
policies should be changed" (p.1190). This type of normative question presupposes that
institutions and policy choices are designed to maximize social welfare. But are they? A
growing literature, at the frontier of economics and political science, views economic-policy
decisions as resulting from the maximization by incumbent politicians of objective func-
tions that may depart from social welfare, under constraints that are primarily political
(see Dixit, 1996; Drazen, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; or Grossman and Helpman,
2001, for recent surveys).
In this perspective, the present paper is a contribution to bridging the gap between the
infrastructure and political-economics literatures (see also, inter alia, Crain and Oakley,
1995, Besley and Coate, 1998, Lizzeri and Persico, 2001, or Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and
Rostagno, 2002). A number of theoretical approaches are available to model the relevant
decision-making processes, depending on the institutional context (e.g. direct vs. indirect
democracy, legislature involvement vs. delegation to executive agencies) and on behavioral
assumptions (e.g. partisan vs. opportunitistic politicians). As infrastructure investment
is not an area in which partisanship creates strong dividing lines, we use a model with
o±ce-motivated politicians and probabilistic voting, to which we add in°uence activites.
The model is then tested on a French data set. Using French data has both bene¯ts and
costs. On one hand, widespread accusations of corruption and pork barrel, in the press and
elsewhere,2 give a fairly strong prior in favor of their existence. On the other hand, there
is little transparency about contributions from lobbies which are, unlike in the US, neither
published nor even o±cially recorded, and consequently cannot be observed directly.
In order to proxy for lobbying, we assume that ¯rms have sunk investments giving
them vested interests in the quality of the infrastructure in regions where they have pro-
duction units (\establishments"). We also posit that a ¯rm with a large establishment in
a given region should be expected to lobby harder than other ¯rms for the maintenance
and upgrading of that region's infrastructure, for three reasons. First, large establishments
2See e.g. de Closets (1992), M¶ eny (1992), Etchegoyen (1995), Lorenzi (1995), or \100 lobbies qui font
la loi en France", Capital, June 18, 1998.
2produce, on average, for more distant markets (as higher volumes must be absorbed by
wider geographical areas); as a result, they use highways and railways more intensively
than others and are consequently more concerned about their maintenance and upgrad-
ing. Second, large establishments are typically owned by ¯rms with headquarters in Paris;
those ¯rms are likely to be in a better position to e®ectively reinforce local lobbying by
direct access to national policy-makers. Third, although we do not deal explicitly with
collective-action problems in mobilizing local political resources, such problems are likely
to be easier overcome for a few ¯rms with large stakes, such as Michelin in Auvergne or
CitroÄ en in Bretagne, than for a host of small or medium-sized local ¯rms. For all these
reasons, we take the number of large establishments in a region as a proxy for the intensity
of that region's lobbying for transportation infrastructure investment.
Although this indirect approach by itself may not be powerful enough to provide un-
ambiguous evidence of pork barrel, the combination of voting with lobbying in the model
generates a number of testable results, including, as is typical in voting models, a dispropor-
tionate share of favors going to swing voters. The importance of the latter in each region is
proxied with two alternative variables. The ¯rst is the di®erence, in absolute value, between
the scores of the right-wing and left-wing coalitions in recent elections. This is not really
a `swing voter' variable, but rather a measure of how heated the electoral race was, which
is slightly di®erent but nevertheless also conducive of political favors. The second is the
combined score of Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National and a fringe hunters' party called
Chasse, p^ eche, nature et tradition. The rationale for taking the Front National as a mea-
sure of swing voters is as follows. Although the party's platform is clearly at the extreme
right wing of the political spectrum,3 a number of observers4 have noted the heterogeneity
of its constituency, which includes, inter alia, disgruntled communist voters attracted by Le
Pen's populist anti-establishment themes as much as by his right-wing ones (law and order
and social conservatism). Similarly, the hunters' party, important in the Southwest, is es-
sentially anti-Brussels and anti-environmentalist. During our sample period, the Socialists
had not yet concluded any alliance with the Green party, and had in fact fairly bad relations
with Greenpeace and environmentalist groups. Thus, the hunters-vs.-environmentalists is-
3Created in 1972 and led since then by Jean-Marie Le Pen, the Front National is an extreme-right wing
party whose rhetoric is a mixture of social conservatism, anti-establishment populism, protectionism and
xenophobia.
4See for instance Mayer and Perrineau (1996), Chiche and Rey (1995), Franceries (1993).
3sue cut across the left-wing/right-wing divide, and using pork-barrel politics to try and
woo hunters or Le Pen voters made sense for either right-wing or left-wing governments.
Indeed, the data suggests that this is precisely what they did, as both measures of
pork barrel (lobbying- and vote-based) tell essentially the same story. Although vote-
based evidence of pork barrel is more direct than lobby-based, our estimates of electoral
and lobbying in°uences should be seen as complementary rather than as a test of one
hypothesis against the other. However, the simultaneity bias from estimating a production
function alone turned out to be negligible, as single-equation elasticity estimates are almost
identical to those obtained by simultaneous estimation of both equations. The reason is
that infrastructure stocks are too large relative to investments for feedback in°uences to
be felt over a sample period of less than a decade.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up a simple
stripped-down model highlighting how electoral and lobbying incentives interact to shape
the policy choices of elected politicians. In section 3, we report the results of empirical
testing of the model's hypotheses on a French data set. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider the following problem. A country is made of two regions indexed by j = 1;2,
and a decision must be made on what quantity of a local public good x should be supplied
in region one,5 given that it is ¯nanced by a nationwide linear income tax. Prior to the
decision, an election is held nationally and the only issue on which two candidates A and B
position themselves is \how much x should be built in region one". In each region, voters
have identical, single-peaked preferences over the interval of feasible values for x. Region
j's population is a fraction ®j of the country's total population, which is also taken as its
electorate and is normalized to equal one (so per-capita and aggregate variables are the
same).
5Restricting the set-up to one local public good only makes it possible to cast the story in a simple
and tractable framework. A limited form of multi-dimensionality (two local public goods instead of one)
is considered in the appendix along the lines of Blomquist and Christiansen (1999). As can be seen (and
is well-known in the political-economy literature) multidimensionality vastly complicates matters but the
°avor of the results is essentially the same.
42.1 Preferences
Letting Uj be the utility function of a representative voter in region j and cj her consump-
tion of an aggregate of private goods, taken together as the num¶ eraire,
Uj (cj;x) = cj + u(Ijx) (1)
where u(:) is an increasing, concave function with limx!1 u0(x) = 0 and limx!0 u0(x) = 1,
and Ij is an indicator function equal to one if j = 1 and zero otherwise. Let ¿ be the °at
rate of an income tax, and yj the representative voter's income. Her budget constraint is
then
cj = (1 ¡ ¿)yj
which, upon substitution into (1), gives the indirect utility function
Vj (¿;yj;x) = (1 ¡ ¿)yj + u(Ijx): (2)
Let y = ®1y1 + ®2y2 be national income. The government's own budget constraint implies
x = ¿y







yj + u(Ijx): (3)




which, after substituting from (3) and taking the ¯rst-order condition, gives
u
0(x
¤) = 1=®1: (4)
As u0 is a decreasing function of x, the amount of public good provided in region one
is (unsurprisingly) an increasing function of its size. With only one region condition (4)






5Regional preferences naturally di®er from the national social optimum. Let x1 the
amount preferred by voters in region one and x2 the amount preferred by voters in region
two (both with regard to the amount of public good provided to region one). Di®erentiating
(3) with respect to x gives respectively
u
0(x1) = y1=y (5)
and
x2 = 0:
The second result is obvious: region two pays but does not get anything and therefore
opposes any positive amount of x. The ¯rst one shows that region one wants more of the
public good than is socially optimal. To see this, observe that y1=y < 1=®1 is equivalent to
®1y1 < y which is always true provided that ®2y2 > 0.
2.2 Electoral competition and lobbying
2.2.1 Politicians
Let xA be the amount of x announced as an electoral platform by candidate A and similarly
for B: Platforms are binding. Candidates are neither pure o±ce-seekers as in Downs' (1957)
nor pure partisans as in Wittman (1973) or Blomquist and Christiansen (1999). Instead,
they maximize an expected rent equal to the product of the probability of being elected
times an o±ce rent, itself made of two components. The ¯rst is an exogenous term ½ that
should be thought of as a pure ego rent. The second is an endogenous term R(x) that
should be interpreted as a post-political life reward (position on a board or so) o®ered by
a lobby interested in x and conditioned on the policy promised and implemented. Thus,






½ + R(xA) if A is elected
0 otherwise.
Let ¼A(xA;xB) be the probability that candidate A is elected given platforms xA and











The presence of R(xA) in the maximand implies a trade-o® for candidate A: placating
voters to get elected or placating the lobby to get a fat reward should he get elected.
62.2.2 Voters
Voting is probabilistic, and voting decisions have three determinants.6 The ¯rst is the utility
di®erential implied by the two platforms, ¢vj = vj(xA)¡vj(xB); which, upon substitution















The second is an exogenous, nationwide popularity factor ¶ in favor of A: The third is a
random shock ¾ij whose realization is individual (hence the index i) but i.i.d (indepen-
dantly and identically distributed) across individuals in region j (hence the index j). The
distribution of ¾ij is uniform over the interval [¡1=2bj;1=2bj]; which implies that it is cen-
tered on zero, and common knowledge. Finally, its realization is known only at the time of
voting, i.e. after candidates have announced their (binding) platforms.
The role of ¾ij and its \variable support" distribution is to characterize the volatility of
regional electorates. A high value of bj means a narrow support for the distribution of ¾ij:
In order to ¯x ideas, take two extreme cases: bj = 0 and bj \very large". In the former case,
the random component of voting behaviour disappears and an arbitrarily small departure
of xA from xB in the direction opposite to region j's preferred value would make A lose all
of j's votes at once. Conversely, with a very wide support (bj large), no matter how far xA
is from xB in the wrong direction, a realization of ¾ij su±ciently large to make j's voters
prefer A is nevertheless possible.









1 if ¢vj + ¶ > ¾ij;
1=2 if ¢vj + ¶ = ¾ij;
0 otherwise.
(7)
Let ¾j = ¢vj +¶ be the value of ¾ij characterizing class j's \marginal voter", i.e. the voter
who is just indi®erent between A and B. By the assumption that preferences are single-
peaked, ¾j is unique, all voters i such that ¾ij < ¾j vote for A, and all such that ¾ij > ¾j
vote for B. Ex ante (before the realization of ¾ij), all voters in region j are identical since
¾ij is i.i.d. Let ¼A
j = ¼j(xA) be the (unconditional) probability that any one of them votes
6The treatment of voter behaviour here follows Persson and Tabellini's error-distribution model (Persson
and Tabellini, 2000).
7for A. Given that the distribution of ¾ij is uniform over [¡1=2bj;1=2bj];
¼
A







This is the probability that a representative region-j individual votes for A and is also A's































®jbj (¢vj + ¶);
which is everywhere a continuous function of xA given xB:
2.3 Electoral equilibrium
































It is apparent from the form of (10) and (11) that in equilibrium both candidates o®er the
same platform (xA = xB) and election probabilities are just equal one half each (¼A =
¼B = 1=2). Identical platforms come in this case from the fact that both candidates cater
to the wishes of the same lobby. If they each had a favored lobby and the lobbies had
extreme positions, platforms would be pulled in opposite directions as if candidates were
partisan.
Given the equilibrium's symmetry, we analyze A's platform only. Taking the ¯rst-order






























®1b1 [½ + R(xA)]
: (13)
8In order to interpret this expression, consider ¯rst the case where lobbying plays no role













The social optimum is attained if regions one and two are of equal electoral sizes (®1 =















The e®ect of an increase in b1 can be seen as follows. Under the second-order condition
(which is easily shown to hold), @Á=@xA < 0 since Á is the objective function's ¯rst deriva-
tive. Writing Á and Á










so dxA=db1 has the sign of @Á=@b1: Taking the partial derivative of (12) with respect to b1























Thus dxA=db1 has the sign of u0 (x1)¡y1=y: This expression is zero at region one's preferred
level of x (see (5)), and is positive for lower values of x: Absent any lobbying, by (14) the
electoral outcome is always less than region one's preferred level, so swing voters get more
in equilibrium.
Consider now the lobbying e®ect. Electoral motives are \neutralized" by setting b1 =
























Recall that 1=®1 is, by (4), the socially optimal level of x. Thus, xA departs from the social
optimum by the second term, which reduces the expression's right-hand side given that
R0 > 0. Thus, lobbying raises the value of xA above the social optimum.
The lobbying term highlights an interesting e®ect of incumbency or popularity advan-
tages. Given that ¼A is a linearly increasing function of A's popularity factor ¶, a higher
9value of ¶ raises the second term of the RHS of (15). This reduces the algebraic value of
the RHS, which reduces the LHS, which, since u0 is a decreasing function, raises xA. So
for a given reward function a strong, popular incumbent will be more inclined to placate
the lobby than a little-known challenger because the latter discounts the reward by the
probability of not getting elected. This means that, ceteris paribus, the platforms of oppo-
sition parties with little chances of winning can be expected to be less polluted by special
interests than those of strong parties with exogenously-high chances of being elected. This
suggest that parties having been in power for long uninterrupted stretches |such as the
Gaullists in France during the 1960's or the PRI in Mexico| seemed so cozy with domestic
lobbies not just because of the familiarity created by repeated interaction, but also because
taking reelection for granted tilts politician incentives away from electoral motives and in
favor of lobbies.
A strong rent from being in o±ce (high ½) has the opposite e®ect because it raises the
intrinsic value of being in power relative to the extrinsic motivation of getting rewarded
later on.
Electoral and lobbying incentives act as perfect substitutes in (12) since their e®ects
are additive. But the combination adds a twist to the \swing-voter" e®ect. Suppose
that the lobby is so aggressive, i.e. that R0 is so high, that x is pushed beyond y1=y,
the level preferred by region one's voters. Then electoral and lobbying motives work at
cross-purposes, as region one's voters would rather have less and pay lower taxes. This
suggests an indirect (and admittedly limited) test of the strength of lobbying in°uences:
if the volatility of a region's electorate leads, in equilibrium, to more of the public good
being provided to that region, then as per the model's logic lobbying in°uences can be
interpreted as \not so strong".
Although highly simpli¯ed, the model outlined so far is suggestive of a number of
variables that can be considered as likely drivers of infrastructure investment decisions.
The following section takes some of these hypotheses to the data.
3 Empirical estimation
In this section, we estimate simultaneously a system of two equations. The ¯rst is a
production function Q = f(K;L;X) of the Cobb-Douglas form:
lnQit = ®0t + ®` lnLit + ®k lnKit + ®x lnXit (16)
10where, using subscripts i for regions and t for time, aggregate value added at the regional
level (Qit) is regressed in log form on ¯xed time-e®ects (®0t, t = 1:::T), employment (Lit)
and the stocks of capital (Kit) and transportation infrastructure equipment (Xit):.Using
lowercase letters to denote variables per worker, so qit = Qit=`it, and so on, (16) can be
rewritten as
lnqit = ®0t + e ®` ln`it + ®k lnkit + ®x lnxit;
where e ®` = ®k + ®x + ®` ¡ 1. Constant returns to scale are rejected if e ®` is estimated to
be signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The second equation is a \policy function"
zit = µ0t + µ2Lit + µ3eit (17)
where regional infrastructure investments per worker zit (the \per-worker" normalization
controls for heterogeneous region sizes) are regressed on time e®ects (µ0t); a measure of
lobbying capacity (Lit, the number of large ¯rms), and a vector eit of proxies for electoral
concerns. The results reported below are based on a linear form for Ã; a log form was tried
with similar results. We also estimated (17) with Lit replaced by Lit=`it, the number of
large ¯rms per worker, with similar although slightly less signi¯cant results.
3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
We use a panel data set covering 21 of France's 22 regions (we excluded Corsica because of
its poor data) over 1985-92. Table 1 provides a brief description of the variables and a list
of the relevant regions. All ¯gures are in 1992 Francs. Q (henceforth V AL) is measured as
value added at factor cost and has been obtained from the Eurostat database `New Cronos'
(June 1999). Regional employment ` (EMP) is also taken from `New Cronos' and covers
all private sectors of the economy. The private capital stock k (CAP) is constructed by the
Laboratoire d'Observation Economique et des Institutions Locales (OEIL) using national
data from INSEE's Compte de Patrimoine and allocating the national stock to the regions
on the basis of corporate tax rates.
The transportation infrastructure stock X (INFRAST) is constructed as follows. As
stock data was not available at the regional level, we construct the stock from investment
data using the perpetual inventory method (PIM). In order to obtain a benchmark stock
level for the initial period, we allocate the national stock, for which data is given by the
F¶ ed¶ eration Nationale des Travaux Publics (FNTP, see also Laguarrigue, 1994) across the
1121 regions in proportion to their average investment share over the ¯rst three years of the
sample period. The relatively slow rate of depreciation of infrastructure capital implies
that our stock converges slowly to the true one. In order to reduce possible biases in the
calculation of the infrastructure stock we use infrastructure investment data going back
to 1975. Aggregating our regional stock data to the national level and comparing it with
national data obtained from INSEE yields only marginal di®erences.
The transportation infrastructure investment data (INV ) come from several sources.
Railway ¯gures were provided directly by SNCF, the national railway company. Highway
¯gures, which are reported for the year in which the work is done (rather than for the
year of budget allocation|there is a delay between the two) have been collected by the
OEIL from data generated by the FNTP (see Fritsch and Prud'homme, 1994, for details).
The FNTP's data are based on reports by the Federation's member companies. Finally,
investment data for waterways was taken directly from the FNTP's statistical yearbook.
Although airport construction data, which we had collected from the Direction G¶ en¶ erale
de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), would have been a natural inclusion in the study, we found
that they were not su±ciently reliable and consequently eliminated them from this study.
The number of industrial establishments with more than 500 employees (LARGE), our
proxy for lobbying forces, is taken from various issues of L'Industrie dans les R¶ egions, a
yearly statistical publication of the Ministry of Industry.
As for our electoral-concern proxies, the ¯rst is DIFF, the di®erence in absolute value
between the electoral scores of the left-wing and right-wing coalitions in the 1986 and
1992 regional elections.7 DIFF is not a proxy for the proportion of swing voters, since
it is the outcome of the vote rather than a characteristic of voters. However, inasmuch
as it is correctly anticipated, a close race can be taken, somewhat loosely, as conducive
to pork-barrel, because it raises the probability of a®ecting the outcome with any given
amount of spending and consequently raises the marginal pro¯tability of spending. Thus,
the parameter estimate on DIFF should intuitively be expected to have a negative sign
in the policy equation. The second proxy, LEPEN, is the combined score of the Front
7\Right wing" was de¯ned in the sample as RPR, UDF and \Divers Droite". Given that mainstream
right-wing parties refused to form alliances with the far-right Front National, the latter was excluded from
the de¯nition of the right wing. \Left wing" was de¯ned as Parti Socialiste, Parti Communiste, Mouvement
des Radicaux de Gauche, and Generation Ecologie, a pro-government environmentalist party, but excluded
\Les Verts", a more radical one which formed an alliance with the Socialists only later on, and \Divers
Gauche". The \Divers Gauche" and \Divers Droite" categories classify independent individuals according
to their voting patterns. For instance, France Unie is classi¯ed as \Divers Droite" before it rallied the
Presidential majority in 1988, and \Divers Gauche" thereafter.
12National and Chasse, P^ eche, Nature et Tradition. This is, according to our reasoning about
the nature of the Front National constituency, a more direct measure of the proportion of
at least one type of swing voters. In the presence of a common-pool problem, swing voters
want more spending: the LEPEN coe±cient estimate should therefore have a positive
sign. Finally, INCUMB is the incumbent's margin, which is one possible measure of the
parameter ¶: as a higher exogenous probability of winning reinforces the power of the lobby's
incentive, a higher value of INCUMB should induce more spending, and its parameter
estimate should accordingly be positive. Moreover, as ¶ and R0 enter multiplicatively in (13),
we expect a positive and signi¯cant parameter estimate on the interaction term INCUMB¤
LARGE.
For o®-election years, we have tried three di®erent formulations for DIFF and LEPEN:
a backward-looking one using the previous election's score, a forward-looking using the
next election's score, and a mixture with moving weights, re°ecting increasing accuracy
and in°uence of opinion polls as elections approach. All three yielded qualitatively similar
results, with slightly better ones for the third approach (mixture), which is the one we
report in Table 3. For INCUMB, only the forward-looking formulation makes sense.
Finally, the dummy variable PARTY is equal to one when the majority in a Regional
Council (and hence the a±liation of the region's President) and that of the government
are either both right-wing or both left-wing, and zero otherwise. Thus, PARTY picks up
speci¯cally that part of spending that is decided upon in Paris and that is targeted at local
political allies. As our sample includes two regional elections (in 1986 and 1992) and two
national legislative elections (in 1986 and 1988), PARTY , which was constructed using
press sources, varies both across regions and across time. We have lagged all electoral
variables by one year to take account of budget delays.
Table 1 here
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for these variables. In 1992 Francs, over the sample
period, average infrastructure investment amounted to 1396 Francs per worker, or roughly
0:54 percent of GDP; the infrastructure stock amounted to 50;920 Francs per worker, or
19:8 percent of GDP.The value of the highway infrastructure stock was about 5 times that
of the railway stock and 70 times that of the waterways infrastructure stock.
Table 2 here
133.2 Estimates
Slightly rewriting (16) and (17), the system to be estimated is thus:
lnV Ait=EMPit = ®t + ®k ln(CAPit=EMPit) + ®` lnEMPit
+ ®x lnf[(1 ¡ ±t) ¤ INFRASTit¡1 + INVit]=EMPitg + ®p PARIS + º1it;
(18)
INVit=EMPit = µt + µ1®xV Ait=INFRASTit¡1 + µ2LARGEit¡1
+ µ3 DIFFi;t¡1 + µ4LEPENi;t¡1 + µ5PARTYi;t¡1 + º2it; (19)
where ºkit = ½kºki;t¡1 + "kit, k = 1;2, and "kit are i.i.d. normal variables with mean zero
and variance ¾k. The term ®xV Ait=INFRASTit¡1 is themarginal product of infrastructure
capital and is included to control for an (out-of-model) economic motivation in infrastruc-
ture spending decisions. Although this term is not suggested by the theory, its inclusion
reduces the scope for omitted-variable bias in the results.
We do not impose constant returns to scale in the production function. As for the infras-
tructure stock variable, we have decomposed it into the sum of a lagged, depreciated value
of the stock ((1¡±t)¤INFRASTit¡1) plus gross investment measured at end of period. The
endogenous variable is INVit. In the policy function, the term µ1 (®xV Ait=INFRASTit¡1)
picks up the e®ect of the marginal product of the infrastructure stock (with a Cobb-Douglas
production function, this is ®x q=x).
The estimation procedure is as follows. We estimate (18) and (19) simultaneously by
non-linear Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML),8 using a Prais-Winston trans-
formation which avoids omitting observations for t = 1, (Greene 1997, p.601). We obtain
the autocorrelation parameters ½k, k = 1;2, in a ¯rst step by consistent estimates. The
results are reported in Table 3.
Endogeneity of the number of large establishments is a potential source of problem.
Indeed, regional private capital stocks could be expected to be a®ected by regional lev-
els of transportation infrastructure if ¯rm location is endogenous (on this, see Aschauer
1989b; see also Combes and Lafourcade (2001) for a recent attempt to estimate the e®ects
of transportation cost declines on the location of economic activity in France). However,
we performed a Hausman test and found that endogeneity of the private capital stock and
employment were both rejected at the 5% level. The reason may be that the private capi-
tal stock includes a substantial fraction of small and medium-sized local companies whose
8Estimations have been carried out using PROC MODEL, SAS 8.02.
14inter-regional mobility is limited. It may also be that net investments are too small relative
to stocks of existing capital for feedback e®ects to be felt signi¯cantly in the stocks over
our relatively short sample period. Having treated explicitly the endogeneity bias on the
infrastructure stock and having found it to be nonexistent (more on this below), given also
the test's results, we feel reasonably con¯dent that any endogeneity bias on the private
capital stock would be small enough to leave our empirical results largely una®ected. We
therefore leave for further research the treatment of location-related issues. By contrast,
the endogeneity problem cannot be brushed aside so easily for large ¯rms, which are likely
to be more mobile than small ones. Short of specifying a full location equation, we have in-
strumented the number of large establishments with its lagged value (without much change
in the results, lending further support to our argumentation above).9 Similar endogeneity
issues arise for election results, which might arguably be sensitive to infrastructure alloca-
tion decisions. Of the two regional elections in our sample period (1986 and 1992), only the
1992 is a potential problem, since the 1986 is one year after the beginning of our sample
and can accordingly be taken as largely predetermined. Instrumenting 1992 election results
with 1986 ones gave disappointing results as 1986 results are a rather poor instrument for
1992 ones. Given that the loss of information appeared to be serious whereas, elections be-
ing typically played on broader issues than just kilometers of roads, the endogeneity bias's
importance was unclear, we decided to keep 1992 results on the right-hand side.
Several speci¯cation tests were performed. In order to test the AR(1) speci¯cation
against the alternative of an AR(2) speci¯cation, we employed the Godfrey Lagrange mul-
tiplier test for non-linear regression models (Godfrey 1988, p. 117; White 1992). This test
statistic has a critical value of 6:635, which implies acceptance of the AR(1) process at
a 1 percent level for all our speci¯cations (see Table 3). We also performed White's test
for heteroscedasticity, which is because of its generality also an indicator for functional
form misspeci¯cation. This statistic is distributed Â2 with 45 degrees of freedom for the
production function and 93 degrees of freedom for the policy equation. Thus, homoscedas-
ticity of errors and functional form speci¯cation is not rejected at a 1% level both for the
production function and the policy equation. It is also comforting that normality of the
9A full model would allow for ¯rm and household mobility in a spatial equilibrium as in Haughwout
and Inman (2000) or Haughwout (2002). However, their model is a complex one while treating policy
regimes as control variables. We chose instead to strip down the underlying economy in order to focus on
the politics.
15error structure is not rejected at a 1% level applying a system test (Henze-Zirkler T). The
estimated AR(1) parameters ½1 and ½2 are about 0:88 and 0:48 respectively.
Table 3 here
3.3 Discussion
Two preliminary remarks on Table 3's results are in point. First, the proportion of the
variability in regional infrastructure investments explained by the policy equation is high
(the R2 is 0:87), given that the equation includes only DIFF, PARTY and two regional
dummies as out-of-model explanatory variables. Second, the reported parameter estimates
turn out to be fairly robust across estimation procedures (OLS and FIML) as well as with
respect to changes in the lobbying variable.
All parameter estimates for electoral variables have the expected signs, and all except
PARTY are signi¯cant at the 1% level, providing strong evidence of pork-barrel and sup-
porting the hypothesis that public goods, even if imperfectly \targetable" (we use here the
term coined by Lizzeri and Persico), are used by politicians as redistribution instruments.
The parameter estimate on LARGE is also signi¯cant at the 1% level, and the positive
and highly signi¯cant parameter estimate on the interaction term INCUMB ¤ LARGE
provides empirical support for (13) since it suggests that, just as predicted, incentives to
placate lobbies are stronger for politicians with strong incumbency advantages. Abundant
anecdotal evidence10 suggests that our results capture a phenomenon that is widely per-
ceived as important. A caveat is in point, however. In our last formulation, lobbying
comes from bene¯ciaries of transportation infrastructure, whereas in reality, the construc-
tion industry itself is an active lobbyist as far as new motorway and high-speed train
construction projects are concerned. Although the construction industry as a whole has
a fairly low concentration, the lobbies behind large projects include a few large ¯rms for
whom location of the work is irrelevant. By contrast, many of the ¯rms that care about
where the work is done are small ones, and some are necessarily below our cuto® of 500
employees (a construction lobbyist once boasted that the industry association has \52,000
10See for instance the cover story of the magazine Capital (June 18, 1998) entitled \100 lobbies qui
font la loi en France"; in particular pp 92{®. According to the magazine, the construction industry is a
major political-campaign contributor and a powerful force behind highway construction projects, although
lobbying by French ¯rms is expected to decline as a result of a Brussels directive imposing open bidding
procedures (and therefore diluting the return to lobbying).
16members, practically one in each commune").11 By contrast, time dummies do not suggest
a discernable election-year pattern.
If the positive results concerning lobbying and electoral concerns were to be expected|
although perhaps not as clear-cut as they turned out to be|the insigni¯cance of the produc-
tivity term, which picks up the government's concern to allocate infrastructure investments
to where their marginal product is highest, is more puzzling. Although it is certainly pos-
sible (in indeed is suggested by the model) that the government simply doesn't care about
the e±cient allocation of resources, this conclusion is probably a strong one to draw from
such limited evidence and given the scope for misspeci¯cation in a simple political-economy
model. Moreover, the variety of state-aid schemes aimed at fostering stronger growth in
backward regions suggests that European governments, including the French one, do care
about convergence|unless, of course, these state-aid schemes are themselves driven by lob-
bying forces. It is therefore fair to say that, as far as this study is concerned, government
objectives in the allocation of transportation infrastructure investment are unclear once
political motivations are controlled for. (We tried including regional unemployment rates
as a right-hand side variable in the policy equation, but it proved insigni¯cant.)
Quantitative estimates are, of course, sensitive to model speci¯cation (although esti-
mates proved remarkably stable) but they nevertheless provide a rough estimate of the
orders of magnitude involved, and it is instructive to take a look at them, albeit a very
cautious one. Ceteris paribus, an additional \representative" large establishment in a re-
gion brings that region 8:63 French Francs (FF) of additional infrastructure investment
per worker each year; or, with an average of 1;022;000 workers, a total of 8:819 million
FF (the number of large establishments per region varies between 5 in Limousin and 113
in Rh^ one-Alpes). A one-standard deviation (6.2 percentage points) increase in the Front
National and hunters' vote brings a region between 134:54 FF and 160:58 FF of additional
infrastructure investment per worker, or 137:5 to 164:11 million FF for the average region
(9:6% to 11:5% of average spending).
Production-function estimates are signi¯cant and have the expected sign. Constant
returns to scale are not rejected, although the test statistic is borderline. The estimated
elasticity b ®k of private capital is 0:18 and is signi¯cant at the 1% level; that of infras-
tructure b ®x is 0:08 and signi¯cant at the 5% level. All estimates are remarkably stable
across estimation procedures. In particular, the OLS infrastructure elasticity estimate is
11Capital, 18 June 1998, p. 92.
17very close, suggesting, as noted in the introduction, that the simultaneous-equation bias
from OLS estimation of the production function is negligible.12 Our estimate of the in-
frastructure share is much lower than Aschauer's (1989) estimate on US aggregate data
(0:39) but the two are not directly comparable since Aschauer's infrastructure variable was
a broad aggregate of public capital whereas ours is limited to transportation infrastruc-
ture. Furthermore, our estimate is unlikely to pick-up spillover e®ects across regions as
Aschauer's aggregate infrastructure estimate does. Munnell's (1990) estimate, which was
more directly comparable to ours in that she used state-level data, was 0:14, whereas de
la Fuente and Vives' (1995) estimate on Spanish regional data was somewhat higher than
ours. Although plausible, our estimate should nevertheless be interpreted cautiously, as
b ®x, in all likelihood, picks up not only the supply-side e®ects of infrastructure investments
(what it is meant to measure) but also their demand-side or Keynesian e®ects; it is in fact
possible that the latter dominates the former. Moreover, as we noted earlier, a common
drawback of the production-function approach is that it takes the private capital stock as
¯xed, which can be a valid approximation of reality only in the short run (see de la Fuente
and Vives, 1995, for a discussion and alternative formulation); the same is true of em-
ployment.Thus, our estimates are best construed as short-term ones. Finally, we have not
included human capital for lack of reliable data; although this is, in general, a potentially
serious omission, systematic cross-regional variation in educational levels also may not be
a serious a problem given France's relatively egalitarian education system.
As the rates of return on infrastructure capital implied by production-function esti-
mates have been a subject of intense debate in the US (see e.g. CBO, 1988, or Gramlich,
1990), it is instructive to calculate the rates of return implied by our estimates for private
and infrastructure capital. Let rk be the rate of return on private capital; in a competitive
environment the unconstrained demand for private capital is given by rk = b ®kq=k. Assum-
ing that the stock of private capital is at its long-run equilibrium level and using national
aggregates of q and k averaged over our sample period, the implied rate of return is 0:157,
which is lower than estimates from US data (see e.g. Munnell, 1990b) but nevertheless
plausible. As for infrastructure, the implied rate of return, using again national aggregates
averaged time-wise, is rx = b ®xq=x = 0:44; this is higher than the upper bound of the
12Note that the mean of the infrastructure stock is 50 times that of the investment, and the standard
deviation is about 12 times larger. Considering this, it is less surprising that the estimates do not change
very much when one switches from OLS to the structural equation of investment in the FIML estimation.
18range of values reported by the US Congressional Budget O±ce, which vary between 0:35
for highway maintenance projects and 0:05 for new rural highway projects (see Gramlich,
1994, table 4). Thus, the high rate of return on infrastructure capital implied by our elas-
ticity estimate suggests that in France's case there is some ground to the claim that, overall,
transportation infrastructure is underprovided, as Aschauer similarly argued for the US; in
fact, using our elasticity estimates, the value of the infrastructure stock that would bring
its rate of return down to the rate of return on private capital would be 140;625 Francs
per worker (roughly $19;000 at the current exchange rate), or three times the current one.
However, the di®erence in rates of return between private and infrastructure capital should
not be overplayed, as rates of return are very sensitive to elasticity estimates, which are
themselves fairly imprecise.13 Moreover, France was, during our sample period, in the mid-
dle of a major e®ort of transportation infrastructure construction, both for highways and
for high-speed railway lines. The picture might be di®erent a decade later.
4 Concluding Remarks
The primary interest of our results is that they highlight the importance of the pork-barrel
dimension of policy-making. They suggest that modelling explicitly the political processes
that drive policy decisions is interesting in its own right, irrespective of whether their omis-
sion would or would not introduce a simultaneity bias in regressions where policy variables
are treated as exogenous. Commenting on the high rates of return on infrastructure in-
vestments estimated by Aschauer, Gramlich (1994) remarked, \If public investment really
were as pro¯table as claimed, would not private investors be clamoring to have the public
sector impose taxes or °oat bonds to build roads, highways, and sewers to generate these
high net bene¯ts? [...] Very little such pressure seems to have been observed, even when
the implied econometric rates of return were allegedly very high" (p.1187). We ¯nd that,
in the absence of a loud clamor, the quiet whisper of lobbies can indeed be heard; but not
necessarily because of high rates of return. We also ¯nd, and that is perhaps more impor-
tant, that roads and railways are not built to reduce tra±c jams: they are built essentially
to get politicians reelected.
As far as policy implications are concerned, our results contain good news and bad news.
The bad news is that pork-barrel matters, whereas other governmental objectives, if any,
13In fact, the di®erence between rx and rk is statistically insigni¯cant at a 10 percent level.
19are unclear. The good news is that the resulting distortions appear to be relatively small.
First, feedback e®ects on production-function estimates are weak, and the marginal product
of infrastructure capital does not vary tremendously across regions, so that departures from
the ¯rst-best allocation of infrastructure across regions are fairly inconsequential. Second,
in rich industrial countries, transportation infrastructure investments are small compared
to the level of existing stocks, so that political distortions in the amounts and spatial al-
location of investments are unlikely to make themselves felt on GDP before a while. But
one should not be excessively optimistic about this. First, if investment decision have al-
ways been made on the basis of pork-barrel politics, the stock levels should themselves be
severely distorted. So our results beg the question: when did things start getting seriously
bad? In France's case, the answer seems to be, fairly recently. The conventional wisdom
among political scientists is that corruption has vastly expanded in the 1980s, largely as
a result of administrative reforms enacted in 1982.14 Second, if pork barrel is prevalent
in infrastructure-investment decisions (although de la Fuente and Vives (1995) found lit-
tle trace of political in°uence in Spanish infrastructure investment decisions), developing
countries are likely to be less robust to the ensuing distortions simply because the stocks
are so much smaller relative to the investments. Under such conditions, political distortions
in the allocation mechanisms are unlikely to be innocuous.
If, as our positive analysis suggests, political distortions ought to be taken seriously, at
least in the long run, one should be able to o®er normative guidance for the design of rules
or institutions that could mitigate those distortions. The second interesting aspect of our
results is that they provide just such a rule. We showed in Section 2 that the lobbying-free
allocation of infrastructure is uniform if its marginal product (®xqit=xit under a Cobb-
Douglas technology) does not vary across regions. Provided that neither productivity
levels nor infrastructure stocks per worker vary too much across regions (our data suggests
that they don't: the standard deviation of infrastructure's marginal product is 0:067, for a
mean of 0:44, a minimum of 0:32 in Provence and a maximum of 0:56 in Alsace), uniform
allocation is thus a fairly good rule of thumb. Even if the ratio ®xqit=xit varies, it is not
a very di±cult one to compute, so the more sophisticated rule is itself not excessively
demanding.
Several caveats are in point. First, as pointed out by Haughwout, treating ¯rm and
14See e.g. M¶ eny, 1992; Borraz and Worms, 1996; or SCPC, 1994. We are grateful to Jean-Louis Briquet,
from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, for a useful conversation on this and for attracting our
attention to the relevant political-science work.
20household location decisions as predetermined may be inappropriate (although perhaps
less so in France than in the US). Second, if our allocation rule is clear, how it should
be implemented is less so. Delegation to an independent policy-making body may be one
answer, whether this body is an independent national agency, like a regulator or a central
bank, or an unelected supranational body like the EU Commission. Another answer lies at
the opposite extreme of the spectrum: rather than sheltering policymakers, it consists of
exposing them. Recent work by Besley and Burgess (2001) on India highlights the power
of the press in disciplining politicians. What mixture of sheltering and exposure would
best control pork-barrel politics is a question that we leave open; only careful international
comparisons will shed light on it. What is clear from our work is that France does not yet
seem to have the answer.
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255 Appendix
This appendix extends the \one-road" model of Section 2 to a \two-roads" models µ a la
Blomquist-Christiansen (1999, henceforth BC).
5.1 Set-up
Because a road is to be built in each one of the two regions, the policy vector is now
x = (x1;x2): Voter preferences are as before and remain in particular ex-ante identical
across regions, but for future use let us label as A1 and A2 respectively two assumptions
made about the direct utility function in section 2.1, namely,
A1 limx!1 u0 (x) = 0
and
A2 limx!0 u0 (x) = 1:
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0 otherwise,
(21)













































Let L denote the set of lobby members |which we take for simplicity as a singleton| and
vL (x) the lobby's utility. Let N be the set of voters and M = L [ N: Let also X¤ be the
set of Pareto-optimal policies, Pareto-optimality being de¯ned over the set M. From now
on, we suppose that R(x) = R(x0) for any two policies x abd x0 such that vL(x) = vL(x0).
26Proposition A1: Any policy xk satisfying (20) belongs to X¤:
Proof: Suppose not, and without loss of generality let k = A. Then there exist two policies


























¯rst case, again without loss of generality. Suppose ¯rst that xA is pitched in a pairwise
vote against an arbitrary xB, and observe how the probability of voting for A changes






















is equal to either one-half or one. That is, the marginal voter in a vote between xA and
xB becomes favorable to A in a vote between e xA and xB. Thus, A's probability of election





Moreover, this statement holds irrespective of the relative sizes of regions one and two.
It follows that xA cannot satisfy (20), a contradiction. The logic of the second case is
identical. Q.E.D.
As argued in BC, Proposition one reduces the dimensionality of the policy problem
from two to one, since all candidate-equilibrium policies lie on the Pareto frontier. We now
establish the existence of a policy equilibrium. For this, it su±ces to show that reaction
functions in the space of Pareto-e±cient policies cross at least once. Let us start by de¯ning
the set V ¤ as the set of pairs (v1;v2), v1 being a level of utility for region one's representative
individual and v2 the same thing for region two, attainable by Pareto-optimal policies; and
two real-valued functions ­v and ­v such that the pair [v1;­v (v1)] belongs to V ¤ and the
pair [x1;­x (x1)] belongs to X¤ We assume that the functions ­v and ­x are well-de¯ned





V ¤ ! [0;y1]
(v1;v2) ! y
associating to each Pareto-optimal pair of utilities a scalar y de¯ned on a ¯nite interval
[0;y1]: The function Ã formalizes the reduction of the problem's dimensionality. Let v1
1 =
max fv1 2 R+ : (v1;v2) 2 V ¤g and v1
2 = ­(v1
1): In words, v1
1 is the highest level of utility
attainable by region one on the Pareto frontier, and v1
2 is the corresponding level of utility
15This assumption is convenient but not innocuous. It rules out, in particular, Pareto frontiers bending
inward at the extremes as in BC's Figure 2.
27for region two. Similarly let v0
2 = max fv2 2 R+ : (v1;v2) 2 V ¤g and v0
1 = ­¡1 (v0
2): In
words, v0
2 is the highest level of utility attainable by region two on the Pareto frontier and
v0
1 is the corresponding level for region one.
By non-satiation (i.e. the assumption that u0 is strictly increasing for all ¯nite values of
x), v1
1 de¯nes a unique pair (x1
1;0) in which there is no road in region two and v0
2 de¯nes a
unique pair (0;x0
2) in which there is no road in region one. We construct the function Ã so
that Ã (v0
1;v0
2) = 0; Ã (v1
1;v1
2) = y1; and Ã (v1;v2) 2 ]0;y1[ for all other pairs (v1;v2) in V ¤.
The function Ã makes it possible to establish the existence of a policy equilibrium
by observing the properties of reaction functions de¯ned on [0;y1]
2. Candidate A's best







yB ! RA ¡
yB¢
;
and candidate B's best response, RB; can be de¯ned similarly.16 Following the logic of




of A0s reaction function is above the 45o line at 0; below at y1; and conversely for B0s.
Proposition A2: At least one policy equilibrium exists.
Proof: Let yB = 0; so xB
1 = 0 and xB
2 = x0
2: For some " > 0; consider a policy yA such that
xA
1 = " and xA
2 = x0
2 ¡ ", and let " tend to zero. By A1 and A2, u0 is ¯nite everywhere












¡u(0) is not. Thus, policy yA is better than policy yB (although it does not
guarantee election with probability one). It follows that yA = yB cannot be a best response,
which must then necessarily lie above the 45o line. A similar argument establishes that
if yB = y1; then yA = y1 cannot be a best response either. Therefore, by continuity, the
graph of RA must cross the 45o line at least one from above. A similar argument can be
used to show that yB (0) > 0 and yB (y1) < y1; so that, in
¡
yA;yB¢
space, RB must cross
RA at least once from below. Q.E.D.
Having established the equilibrium's existence, we can now characterize it the same
way we did in Section 2. Politician A's maximization problem, once Pareto optimality is























































































































































As the LHS and second term of the RHS are both positive, it follows that in any interior
solution, locally 1 + ­0
x > 0: With this caveat the interpretation and properties of (22) are
the same as before.
29Table 1: Variable Description and Regions
Variable Description
V A Regional GDP, million 1992 Francs
EMP Regional employment, million individuals
CAP Non-residential private capital stock, million 1992 Francs
INFRAST Transportation infrastructure stock, million 1992 Francs
INV Transportation infrastructure net investments, million 1992 Francs
LARGE Number of establishments with more than 500 employees
PARTY Dummy =1 when local/national political congruence
DIFF Absolute value of RW score minus LW score, in percent. points
LEPEN Front National + hunters' party combined scores, in percent. points
INCUMB Incumbent's margin, in percent. points
Regions
Alsace Champagne-Ardennes Midi-Pyren¶ ees
Aquitaine Franche-Comt¶ e Nord-Pas de Calais
Auvergne Haute-Normandie Pays de Loire
Basse-Normandie Ile-de-France Picardie
Bourgogne Languedoc-Roussillon Poitou-Charentes
Bretagne Limousin Provence-Alpes-C^ ote d'Azur
Centre Lorraine Rh^ one-Alpes
30Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
V A=EMP 256723 27380.40 195921 357617
CAP=EMP 298142 62624.98 188442 484980
INFRAST=EMP 50920 9412.91 35453 70935
V A=INFRAST 5.166 0.8416 3.849 7.405
INV=EMP 1396 628.15 412 4934
LARGE 35.27 21.66 5 113
LARGE=` 42.62 17.56 11.90 79.64
DIFF 6.94 5.404 0.03 35.10
INCUMB 5.42 6.824 -14.50 26.6
LEPEN 13.9 6.239 3.40 26.6
XHIGHWAY =XRAIL 5.1 2.36 1.74 13.68
XHIGHWAY =XWATER 68.8 80.17 2.27 2.90
Total number of observations: 168
31Table 3: Estimation Results
OLS FIML FIML
Variable estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat
Production function: Dependent Variable ln(V A=EMP)
85 3.940 21.21 3.905 21.95 3.919 22.04
86 3.969 21.33 3.934 22.07 3.948 22.16
87 3.985 21.34 3.950 22.09 3.964 22.18
88 4.003 21.32 3.967 22.07 3.981 22.15
89 4.021 21.29 3.985 22.04 3.999 22.12
90 4.013 21.19 3.977 21.93 3.991 22.01
91 4.011 21.05 3.975 21.79 3.989 21.87
92 4.027 21.03 3.991 21.77 4.005 21.85
CAP=EMP 0.182 5.26 0.186 5.59 0.182 5.50
EMP 0.029 1.84 0.030 1.96 0.028 1.87
INFRAST=EMP 0.080 1.90 0.083 2.06 0.086 2.16
PARIS 0.214 4.95 0.217 5.20 0.219 5.27
AR(1) 0.888 0.888 0.888
Godfrey LM Test 1.949 1.999 1.982
White Test 37.05 36.81 37.14
R2 0.9575 0.9577 0.9576
Policy function: Dependent Variable INV=EMP
Variable
85 2416.68 6.27 2579.74 7.06 3200.21 9.74
86 2452.16 6.26 2616.15 7.05 3237.91 9.69
87 2437.17 5.94 2599.92 6.71 3239.32 9.18
88 2663.08 6.36 2833.54 7.16 3473.72 9.56
89 2867.94 6.97 3055.73 7.81 3676.67 10.12
90 2701.02 6.49 2892.57 7.31 3508.87 9.48
91 2821.59 6.83 3016.82 7.66 3625.54 9.77
92 2655.02 6.38 2853.97 7.19 3459.01 9.18
®xV A=INFRAST -1792.84 -1.43 -2107.62 -1.73 -2607.13 -1.95
PARTY 117.17 1.50 130.43 1.79 95.31 1.33
DIFF -34.62 -2.55 -32.70 -2.58 -38.83 -3.73
LEPEN 29.31 3.26 25.93 3.07 21.72 2.63
LARGE 8.25 3.87 8.63 4.39 | |
INCUMB 26.26 2.29 25.65 2.42 | |
INCUMB ¤ LARGE | | | | 0.91 5.73
TGV CENTRE 1096.46 5.42 1139.09 6.03 1172.25 6.23
TGV NORD 3112.54 11.21 3124.73 12.06 3230.35 12.75
PARIS -619.28 -1.78 -608.64 -1.89 2.41 0.01
AR(1) 0.492 0.486 0.471
Godfrey LM Test 1.193 2.016 1.764
White Test 118.6 116.1 107.9
R2 0.8753 0.8747 0.8741
Henze-Zirkler T 2.11 2.04 1.76
32